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Few individuals are more closely associated with the project of European Economic 
Monetary Union (EMU) than Jacques Delors.1 As French finance minister between 1981 and 
1984, Delors played a decisive role in le tournant de la rigueur, the economic U-turn that saw 
President François Mitterrand abandon expansionary policies in favour of fiscal 
consolidation, market reforms, and continued membership of the European Monetary System 
(EMS). This move not only paved the way for France’s recommitment to EMU, it also 
propelled Delors to the presidency of the European Commission, a post that he held between 
1984 and 1995. 
 
The Community made major strides towards EMU during Delors’ time in Brussels. The 
signing of the Single European Act in 1986 ended the de facto moratorium on EMU by 
recalling the EEC heads of state and government’s commitment at Paris in 1972 to ‘the 
progressive realization of economic and monetary union’ (Heads of State and Government 
1972). This set the scene for the European Council’s decision at Hanover in June 1988 to 
convene a high-level committee led by Delors to study and propose ‘concrete stages towards 
this union’ (Council of the European Union 1988). The Delors Report, as it came to be 
known, served as a rough blueprint for the first stage of EMU, which was launched by the 
European Council in June 1989. This led to a firm commitment to a single currency, 
alongside looser plans for political union in the Maastricht Treaty, which envisaged two 
further stages to EMU, the first of which began in January 1994 as Delors entered the final 
twelve months of his presidency. 
 
Whether Delors was an architect of EMU or more of a draughtsman is a matter of debate 
within the scholarly literature. For Moravcsik (1998: 435–6), Delors did little more beyond 
his time as French finance minister than lend his name to a committee in which the 
preferences of national policy-makers dominated. The Commission president drafted much of 
the final report. But, Moravcsik argues, it was left to the national central bank governors who 
made up the majority of this committee to make substantive proposals on the possible design 
of EMU. Dyson and Featherstone (1999: 717), in contrast, see Delors’ approach as a 
calculated one designed to mollify Bundesbank president Karl Otto Pöhl, while relying on the 
other central bank governors present to put forward proposals with which the Commission 
president was sympathetic. Either way, Delors handled his brief well and can claim credit for 
encouraging consensus within a committee comprised of what Harold James (2012: 237) 
describes as ‘a combination of skeptics and enthusiasts’. 
 
                                                        
1 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the British Academy in October 2013 and 
at the National Bank of Belgium in March 2015. Thanks to the participants at these 
conference and, in particular, Kenneth Dyson, Piers Ludlow, Ivo Maes, and Niels Thygesen 
for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
This chapter is less interested in Delors’ political influence on, than in his personal vision of, 
EMU. It seeks, in particular, to understand what Delors’ idea of EMU was, how it evolved 
over time, and what its legacy is for contemporary debates about the single currency. In so 
doing, it tries to reconcile some of the contradictions concerning Delors’ reputation as a 
consummate technocrat with a strong ideological commitment to the European project, as an 
economist with a passion for theology, and as an enthusiastic proponent of the euro who later 
admitted to fundamental flaws in EMU’s design and execution. 
 
The central argument is that Delors’ vision of EMU was a blurred one. Although the 
Frenchman’s public support for the project can be traced back to the early 1960s, he remained 
vague about the precise meaning and purpose of monetary union until the Delors Committee 
concluded its work. Even then, the Commission president remained guarded about his plans 
for European economic governance and remained so after he left the Commission in 1995. 
Ambiguity is an important part of a diplomat’s toolkit (Jönsson and Hall 2003). However, 
this chapter sees Delors’ opacity as more than just a negotiating device. Delors’ blurred 
vision of EMU, it suggests, is indicative of his lived experience as an economist, political 
activist, and politician en route from Paris to Brussels and back again. Much is made in the 
literature of Delors’ Catholicism and his commitment to European integration (Grant 1994; 
Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Rollat 1993). Such accounts overstate the ideational 
importance of Delors’ Catholicism for EMU, however, while understating both his reluctance 
to align himself with any one mainstream macro-economic theory and his unease with 
European federalism. 
 
Delors’ economic eclecticism helps to explain why he did not begin with a fixed definition of 
EMU and how he was able to build an alliance with the more Keynesian-minded members of 
the Delors Committee, while making concessions to the Ordo-liberals who sought greater 
emphasis on price stability, central bank independence, and fiscal discipline. Delors’ views 
on European federalism are also important since they shed light on the Commission 
president’s determination to follow Member States’ political lead on EMU and his initial 
reluctance about championing a centralized approach to monetary policy. They also account 
for Delors’ frustrations regarding debates about political union at Maastricht. 
 
Seen in these terms, Delors’ long-term legacy in relation to EMU is a divided one. On the one 
hand, Delors succeeded where his predecessors as Commission president had failed by 
keeping an open mind about EMU’s design and taking his political cues from the Member 
States. On the other hand, such pragmatism raises the question of whether Delors thought 
through the full implications of creating a single currency and whether he could and should 
have done more to address his concerns over European economic governance. 
 
INSIGHT 
 
Born in Paris in 1925, Jacques Delors was an early and enthusiastic proponent of European 
monetary cooperation. Having founded the periodical Citoyens 1960, cahiers d’éducation 
politique, économique et sociale in 1960 and served as its first editor, Delors lent his support 
to the European Commission’s Action Programme for the Second Stage of the Community, 
which suggested that monetary union could go hand in hand with the completion of the single 
market (see Grant 1994: 24; see also Chapter 3 by Seidel). As a Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) from 1979 to 1981, Delors produced a positive assessment of the EMS in 
his capacity as chair of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (Grant 1994: 44). As 
French finance minister from 1981 to 1984, Delors faced down calls from within François 
Mitterrand’s circle of advisers to leave the EMS. This defence of European monetary 
cooperation helped to cement Delors’ reputation at home and abroad and so aided his rise to 
the presidency of the European Commission. For François Mitterrand, the Berlaymont was a 
useful place to send one of his more belligerent cabinet members (Delors 2004: 209). Delors’ 
reputation as an economic reformer, meanwhile, endeared him to UK Prime Minister  
Margaret Thatcher, albeit briefly (Thatcher 2011: 548). 
 
In the months before he took office as Commission president in January 1985, Delors toured 
national capitals to take soundings from the EEC heads of state and government on EMU, 
among other ideas for relaunching European integration (Delors 1994: 220). Although 
national leaders remained circumspect about EMU at this juncture, Delors still made the case 
for ‘increased monetary integration’ in his maiden speech to the European Parliament as 
Commission president (Delors 1985a). What he meant by ‘increased monetary integration’ at 
this time was not easy to discern. In a speech to the Confederation of British Industry in 
October 1985, the Commission President called for ‘a genuine European monetary area’, but 
he did not say what such an area would entail other than alluding to the fact that it would go 
beyond the EMS in its current form (Delors 1985b). 
 
At the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the Single European Act in October and 
November of that year, Delors was more forthcoming in his call for a full incorporation of the 
EMS into the new treaty alongside a clause for the creation of a European Monetary Fund, 
but such proposals failed to win the support of all Member States (Grant 1994: 73). More 
successful was Delors’ support for including a general reference to EMU in the Single 
European Act, the final text of which recalled EEC heads of states’ commitment to EMU in 
Paris in 1972 and included a new chapter on economic and monetary policy coordination. For 
Moravcsik (1998: 21) these provisions amounted to no more than a ‘rhetorical commitment’, 
but Delors (2004: 280) saw them as providing an impetus for subsequent discussions of 
EMU. 
 
The heads of state and government signed the Single European Act in February 1986. 
Thereafter Delors said more about his vision of EMU but still not that much. Appearing 
before the European Parliament at this time, Delors acknowledged that the time was ‘not yet 
ripe’ for radical reform of the EMS and argued, instead, that the free movement of capital 
was a key stumbling block in this regard (European Commission 1986a). In May 1986, the 
Commission outlined its ‘Programme for the Liberalization of Capital Movements in the 
Community’. In this Communication it was recognized that free movement would entail 
‘greater uniformity within the Community of the techniques of monetary control’, but it did 
not say how (European Commission 1986b). Instead, this question was left to a ‘forward 
study’ on the implications of financial integration for monetary cooperation, led by Tomasso 
Padoa-Schioppa, a former director general for economic and financial affairs at the European 
Commission and someone who would exercise a major intellectual influence on Delors (see 
Chapter 9 by Masini). 
 
The Padoa-Schioppa Report, which was published in April 1987, weighed its words 
carefully. It did not call outright for EMU but concluded rather that ‘the elimination of 
exchange-rate controls, coupled with the requirements of exchange-rate stability . . . will 
require moving closer to the unification of monetary policies’ (Padoa-Schioppa 1987: 3–4). It 
was not so much this policy conclusion that attracted attention as the economic reasoning that 
underpinned it. Member States faced an inconsistent quartet, Padoa-Schioppa memorably 
argued, between completing the single market, facilitating the free movement of capital, 
ensuring exchange-rate stability, and maintaining autonomy in monetary policy. Having 
embarked on the single market project, in other words, Member States faced a choice 
between national monetary policies and EMU. 
 
Delors’ reading of Padoa-Schioppa’s report was a curious one. Although the Commission 
president needed no convincing that capital market liberalization would serve as a catalyst for 
European monetary cooperation, he paid little heed in public to Padoa-Schioppa’s implicit 
critique of the EMS as a half-way house between national autonomy in macro-economic 
matters and no autonomy at all. Instead, Delors continued to champion the EMS as a 
successful exchange-rate regime that would encourage stability in Europe and in the 
international monetary system more generally (e.g. Delors 1987). 
 
Political tactics were clearly at play here, but so too were economic convictions. This tension 
in the Commission president’s thinking came to a head during the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) crises of 1992–3. Speaking to the European Parliament in the aftermath of ‘Black 
Wednesday’, when the United Kingdom exited the ERM, Delors acknowledged that EMU 
had ‘presupposed a medium-term economic strategy, based on gradual convergence of our 
economies, underpinned by the consolidation and the successes of the European Monetary 
System’ (Delors 1993). Padoa-Schioppa laboured under no such illusion. The inconsistent 
quartet, he would later write, meant that ‘it would have been Utopian to consider an 
adjustable peg such as the EMS as being indefinitely sustainable [since] . . . the only 
sustainable solution indeed was the single currency’ (Padoa-Schioppa 2000b: 2). 
 
Although Delors maintained his mantra in public on strengthening of the EMS, he stepped up 
his campaign for EMU behind closed doors. At the European Council in Copenhagen in 
December 1987 Delors canvassed EC leaders about convening a ‘wise-persons’ group on 
EMU but said nothing about this issue in public (Delors 1994: 420). Whereas German foreign 
minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and French finance minister Édouard Balladur put forward 
bold plans in early 1988 for a European central bank with a single currency, Delors struck a 
conservative tone at this time. The EC should not abandon the ‘pragmatic approach that has 
served us well’ he told MEPs in January 1988, while indicating that continued efforts to 
promote the European Currency Unit (ECU) as a private currency and overhaul the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund would suffice for the time being (Delors 1988). Such public 
caution did not, however, prevent Delors from holding a series of bilateral behind the scenes 
meetings with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on EMU in the months ahead. It was on the 
basis of these meetings that Kohl arrived at the idea of a high-level committee on EMU, 
chaired by Delors, a decision that was ratified by the European Council in Hanover in June 
1988 (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 712). 
 
Delors brought his considerable political talents to bear in the Committee for the Study of 
Economic and Monetary Union. The twelve central bank governors and three external 
participants who made up the Delors Committee may have shared causal beliefs about the 
importance of low inflation and stable exchange rates and a normative commitment to 
European monetary cooperation (Verdun 1999). But they came to the forum with disparate 
views about EMU and varying degrees of good will. Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl 
cast himself as leader of the awkward squad, and it took a concerted effort from Delors to 
keep the German central banker engaged in the work of the committee (see Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999: 342–8). What Delors did not bring to the committee was a clear and 
compelling vision of EMU. For the most part, the Commission president was content to let 
other committee members take the floor (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 714). He also 
allowed Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, as co-rapporteur, to shape the terms of discussion through 
position papers and a skeleton draft of the final report (James 2012: 246–8). 
 
To suggest that Delors was agnostic about EMU’s design would be misleading. Initially, as 
Dyson and Featherstone (1999: 717) note, Delors favoured a European Monetary Fund tasked 
with coordinating Member States’ monetary policy in keeping with the French tradition on 
EMU. He was not wedded to this approach, however, and left open the door to the idea of a 
European central bank with centralized control of monetary policy even before the committee 
had met (Delors 1988). Delors was less guarded on the fiscal dimension of EMU, arguing 
against binding fiscal rules on government borrowing on the grounds that financial market 
discipline would keep Member States in check (James 2012: 252). 
 
For all his reticence about national fiscal rules, Delors was reluctant to leave fiscal policy to 
the discretion of Member States. Here he made the case for a political counterweight to the 
ECB that could facilitate ‘an EC countercyclical policy’ (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 718). 
To this end, he called for an increase in the Community budget from 1.2 to 3.0 per cent by the 
year 2000 (James 2012: 253). This idea was not backed in the final report, which considered 
a number of arguments in favour of a supranational budgetary authority (Thygesen 1989: 
639–40), while accepting that ‘the centrally managed Community budget [was] likely to 
remain a very small part of total public sector spending’ (Committee for the Study of 
Economic and Monetary Union 1989: 19–20). 
In addition to his role as chair, Delors presented two background papers to the Committee for 
the Study of Economic and Monetary Union. The first was a short note, more political than 
economic in character (Delors 1989a). On the surface this note offered a descriptive overview 
of the key stages in European monetary cooperation since the Werner Report. This 
chronology was punctuated, however, by a cautionary tale about the ‘creeping paralysis’ that 
results when Member States reject the Community method, an approach to policy-making 
that emphasizes the ‘progressive and limited transfer of powers to common institutions 
possessing a real power to make decisions’ (Delors 1989b: 64). 
 
The second paper was richer in economic analysis. In this piece, Delors focused on the risks 
of regional imbalances in EMU and policy options available in the absence of national 
exchange-rate policy. Delors covered familiar ground here by arguing that the experience of 
more mature monetary unions, although by no means uniform, pointed towards ‘a substantial 
development of the budgetary function of the EC in the case of monetary union’ (Delors 
1989b: 82). More innovative were his thoughts on the possible functions of such a budgetary 
instrument, with the schemes ‘designed to compensate for institutional rigidities in factor or 
price mobility’ or ‘sustain income and demand in the regions . . . that may be economically 
weakened’ rejected in favour of ‘decentralized supply-side regional policies’ focused on 
‘subsidized investments in physical infrastructure and human capital’ (Delors 1989b). 
 
It is in regional policy that Delors’ imprint on the committee’s final report is most 
discernible. Although the report steered clear of explicitly recommending a centralized 
budgetary instrument, it acknowledged concerns over regional imbalances in EMU and 
underlined the need for ‘common policies aimed at structural change and regional 
development’ (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union 1989: 16). 
Having given a cautious welcome to the Delors Report at the European Council in Madrid in 
June 1989, EC heads of state and government decided in December of that year to convene 
an IGC on EMU. In approaching this conference, Delors stood by the conclusions of his 
eponymous committee for the most part, even on those points on which the central bank 
governors had overruled him. In a note circulated to EC finance ministers in March 1990, the 
Commission president agreed that EMU would be based on a common monetary policy 
controlled by an independent central bank, something which he had initially resisted in the 
Delors Committee, and ‘in the budgetary policy field, a system of coordination and voluntary 
constraints designed to guarantee both consistency with the stability-oriented monetary policy 
and a satisfactory overall policy-mix’ (European Commission 1990a). 
 
Having previously rejected the need for binding rules on government borrowing, the 
Commission president now argued that ‘the convergence of budgetary policies can . . . be 
sought more appropriately through procedures to which all Member States would be bound’ 
(European Commission 1990a). No mention was made here of the pecuniary sanctions that 
would be provided for under the Maastricht Treaty’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). 
Delors was not against a rules-based approach per se but argued for the incorporation of 
‘budgetary rules or guidelines into national law’ and a ‘graduated response’ to profligate 
Member States, beginning with recommendations and ending with ‘the withdrawal of 
conditional Community budgetary assistance’ (European Commission 1990a). 
 
If Delors presented an essentially conservative view of EMU’s architecture, he could not 
resist a few embellishments. Noticeable in this regard was a reprisal of arguments for 
strengthening regional funds for EMU, including a centralized budgetary instrument to 
provide a ‘shock-absorber mechanism capable of reacting promptly in the event of 
unexpected economic shocks’ (European Commission 1990a). The aforementioned reference 
to conditional assistance was also significant since it hinted at the need for a fiscal crisis-
resolution mechanism. On this point Delors was adamant that a no-bail-out clause did ‘not 
exclude conditional assistance’ (European Commission 1990a). 
Aside from an agreement by Member States to establish a new EU regional policy 
instrument, the Cohesion Fund, the IGC on EMU offered Delors few of these additional 
desiderata. Still, such negotiations were plain-sailing for the Commission president compared 
to the IGC on political union, agreed in April 1990. Although the IGC turned out to have 
little to do with EMU, Member States agreed to instigate intergovernmental cooperation in 
the domains of foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. In their letter to the 
Irish presidency of the EC in April 1990, Kohl and Mitterrand, the two driving forces behind 
political union, called for an acceleration of ‘the political construction of the Europe of the 
Twelve’ not only because of ‘far-reaching changes in Europe’ but also in view of ‘the 
realisation of economic and monetary union’ (Kohl and Mitterrand 1990). 
 
If Delors was primed for a debate on EMU in 1988, he was less keen to have one on political 
union two years later. Having failed to convince Kohl and Mitterrand to convene a high-level 
committee to explore the concept of political union, he made little attempt to disguise his 
unease with the project (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 722). Speaking in Ireland in April 
1990, the Commission president asked: ‘Why has the question of the political and 
institutional future of the Community become topical?’ (Delors 1990a). His answer, on this 
occasion, touched on Germany’s concern that German unification should take place within a 
European context, the perceived discord between economic and political integration, and the 
need for greater democratic and political accountability as part of moves towards EMU. 
Relevant though these issues were, Delors struggled to weave them together into a coherent 
narrative and in so doing demonstrated just how speculative his thinking on political union 
was at this juncture. 
 
The following months brought more rather than less confusion for Delors. Having intended to 
publish a plan on political union in April 1990, the Commission delayed doing so until 
October of that year (Grant 1994). This text was a motley collection of proposals on foreign 
policy cooperation, democratic legitimacy, and institutional questions, all very much in 
keeping with the subject matter of the IGC but no less lacking in coherence for that. These 
proposals divided Member States to varying degrees, as did draft treaties circulated by the 
Luxembourg and Dutch EC presidencies. Having railed against the Luxembourg draft for its 
failure to uphold the Community method, Delors tried but failed to secure support for the 
Dutch draft, only to see Member States switch back to the Luxembourg draft. As a result of 
this reversal, Delors found himself marginalized in the IGC on political union and sorely 
disappointed with the final text (Wester 1992: 212). The Commission president’s doubts 
about the Maastricht Treaty, he would later admit, were one reason why he remained aloof 
from France’s close-run referendum campaign in 1992 (Delors 1994: 275). 
 
In January 1993, Delors agreed to serve a third truncated term as Commission president, so as 
to allow the European Parliament to exercise its new consultative role in appointing the 
College of Commissioners from January 1995. Speaking to MEPs in the midst of the ERM 
crisis and a yet-to-be-resolved political emergency over Denmark’s rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Delors cut a disconsolate figure. ‘The economy is in crisis’, he 
told MEPs, ‘society is in crisis, democracy is foundering . . . [t]he very idea of a united 
Europe is in peril’ (Delors 1993). 
 
Amid this doom and gloom, Delors’ growing preoccupation with the competitiveness of the 
European economy became apparent. It was this issue rather than EMU that came to define 
his final two years in office. Key in this respect was the Commission’s 1993 White Paper on 
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, a detailed policy plan designed to ‘foster debate 
and to assist decision-making at decentralized national or Community level—so as to lay the 
foundations for the sustainable development of the European economies, thereby enabling 
them to withstand international competition while creating the millions of jobs that are 
needed’ (European Commission 1993). This White Paper was long on economic ideas, short 
on specific proposals, and shorter still in its ambition for the Community to take centre stage 
in relation to economic and social policies. Mention was made of EMU, most noticeably in 
the White Paper’s calls for closer economic policy coordination and a more balanced macro-
economic policy mix, but it was vague on how best to achieve these ends. Striking in this 
regard was the Commission’s reticence about the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPGs), a set of non-binding guidelines on economic policy provided by the Maastricht 
Treaty, which would later come to be seen as central to the EU’s efforts at macro-economic 
policy coordination (see Deroose et al. 2008). Here the report hinted at a lack of consensus 
when it noted that ‘all Member States’ accept the case for ‘a stable framework for 
macroeconomic policy’, while acknowledging that only ‘a number of Member States 
advocate the use of guidelines provided for in the Treaty’ to this end (European Commission 
1993). Either way, the White Paper produced few tangible policy outputs during Delors’ 
remaining months as Commission president, which after a decade of policy activism ended 
with a whimper rather than a bang. 
 
Many expected Jacques Delors to return to a high-level position in French politics after his 
time as Commission president. By late 1994 he was seen by some as the candidate best 
placed to lead the Left to victory in the following year’s presidential election (Tudor 1994). 
In the end, however, Delors refused to stand, leaving the question of what impact he would 
have had as French president as one of the great ‘what if’ questions about EMU. Having 
ruled out a run for the Elysée, Delors returned to Paris to found the think-tank Notre Europe 
in 1996. 
 
Through his activities at Notre Europe Delors emerged as and remained a prolific 
commentator on European affairs, particularly during periods of perceived crisis for the 
European project. The reform of EMU is a recurring theme in such commentary, with Delors 
championing the success of the single currency while calling for greater emphasis on 
economic growth relative to fiscal discipline and for an ‘economic government’ 
(gouvernement économique) to serve as a counterweight to the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Here again Delors’ precise vision of EMU is difficult to discern. Among his more 
concrete recommendations in this regard is a pact for economic policy coordination (pacte 
pour la coordination des politiques économique). However, even this proposal, which was put 
forward in 1997 to counter negotiations over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), is couched 
in generalities about cooperation in areas such as budgetary policy and structural reform 
(Delors 1997). 
 
The Euro Area crisis, it would seem, has had only a limited impact on Delors’ thinking about 
EMU. True, the former Commission president became blunter in his assessment of the single 
currency’s shortcomings and more critical of EU and national policy-makers as the Euro 
Area’s sovereign debt crisis worsened. But, in so doing, he offered a familiar vision of the 
functioning of EMU.2 In December 2011, Delors hit the headlines when he admitted that the 
euro suffered from ‘a fault in execution’ (Moore 2011). Far from being a mea culpa, what 
Delors meant by this remark was not that the Delors Report or the IGC on EMU had been 
mistaken but that Member States had failed to heed his warnings in the early years of EMU 
about the need for a more comprehensive coordination of economic policies. 
 
As the crisis worsened, Delors went further in his calls for a fonds de régulation 
conjoncturelle (Delors 2013). This fund, it would seem, is a return to Delors’ earlier idea of 
the need for a centralized budgetary instrument. But, as always, such proposals are sketched 
with a broad brush rather than in fine detail, leaving his precise vision of EMU a matter of 
interpretation. 
 
HINDSIGHT 
 
Having described Delors’ particular vision of EMU, this chapter moves on to explore the 
political and intellectual context in which his views arose. It is important to note that he had a 
personal connection to the world of central banking. His father, Louis Delors, was a 
messenger boy at the Banque de France. Louis was not entirely satisfied with this position at 
the bank, but he put pressure on his son to apply for a traineeship there. Delors, who had 
planned to go to film school, reluctantly agreed, passed the entrance exam and joined the 
Banque de France in October 1945 (Grant 1994: 9). 
Biographers say little about Delors’ time at the central bank, but it was here that the future 
Commission president spent 17 years learning about the fundamentals of economic policy. 
Grant (1994: 11), for example, concludes that ‘neither the nature of the work nor the bank’s 
culture inspired’ Delors. Milesi (1995) mentions Delors’ time at the central bank only in 
passing and focuses instead on his fledgling political activities in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Although Delors’ first five years at the Banque de France were spent in an essentially 
                                                        
2 Euractiv, ‘Delors points the finger at Europe’s “killers”’, 29 March 2012. Full text available 
at: <http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/delors-denounces-killers-europe-news-511850>.  
managerial role—he ran a team responsible for processing securities transactions—his later 
role in the cabinet of the director general for stocks and money markets ensured an education 
in the functioning of financial markets, exchange rates, and public finances (Delors 2004: 38–
9). This was also a period of intensive academic study for Delors, who took a three-year 
diploma from the Centre d’études supérieures de banque, during which time he attended 
classes on economics, finance, and banking (Delors 2004: 37). 
 
Delors quit the Banque de France in 1962 to join the French Planning Commission 
(Commissariat général du Plan), but a sense that he saw unfinished business in the world of 
central banking is discernible at different stages of his subsequent career. In 1972 Delors was 
appointed by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to the general council of the Banque de France. Later 
Delors said of this move that he was delighted to be back at the central bank and to have an 
opportunity to enrich his knowledge of economic and monetary affairs (Delors 2004: 135). In 
1981 Delors became French finance minister and hence a key actor in relation to monetary 
policy. He was not a free agent here, however, as evidenced by his frustration in autumn 1982 
over the government’s decision to cancel a proposed interest-rate cut on state savings 
accounts. When François Mitterrand later offered him the post of prime minister, Delors 
made it a condition that he would assume control of monetary policy (Delors 2004: 210). 
Mitterrand was unwilling to accept such terms, however, and Delors remained as finance 
minister, albeit with an enlarged portfolio and a higher rank in cabinet. Another instance of 
Delors’ enduring interest in central banking was his decision as president of the European 
Commission to attend monthly meetings of the Committee of EC Central Bank Governors. 
This was not a standard operating procedure for a Commission president but a deliberate 
attempt by Delors to gain access to the ‘enclosed world of central banking’ (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999: 708). 
 
If this account gives a sense of Delors’ personal connection to the world of central banking, it 
does not tell us where his intellectual influences came from and how they shaped his vision of 
EMU. Scholars seeking to understand Delors’ motivations as a political actor have placed 
great emphasis on his Catholic faith (see, for example, Grant 1994: 236–9; Drake 2000: 30). 
The interplay between politics and religion certainly seems to have been important for the 
young Delors, who joined the international movement La Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne and 
developed an interest in social Catholicism through his involvement in the trade union La 
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens. Ross places particular emphasis on 
Delors’ Jansenism, a strain of Catholic thought comparable to Calvinism (Ross 1995: 176). 
Dyson and Featherstone go further by arguing that Jansenism endowed Delors with a moral 
seriousness, a frugality, an individualistic streak, a tendency towards pedagogy and 
didacticism, and a concern for solidarity, all of which made their mark on his approach to 
EMU negotiations (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 695–6). It is not difficult to recognize 
Delors in some of these character traits, but Jansenism is a broad collection of beliefs that can 
be reconciled with a variety of personality types and political philosophies (see, for example, 
McLendon 2006). 
 
Scholars seeking to understand Delors’ Catholicism have also attached great importance to 
his interest in Emmanuel Mounier, a French Catholic philosopher who in the 1930s 
developed a ‘personalist’ critique of ‘bourgeois civilization’ that called for greater emphasis 
on individualism and communitarianism (e.g. Grant 1994: 12–15; Ross 1995: 17). 
Personalism is arguably a better philosophical fit for Delors than Jansenism for two reasons. 
First, Delors has made little public comment about his Jansensism but, in contrast, has rarely 
missed an opportunity to talk about Mounier. A case in point is Delors’ speech to the College 
of Europe in October 1989 in which he stated his position ‘as an advocate of personalism 
also, and as a disciple of Emmanuel Mounier whose influence will, I am sure, become once 
again very important as Europeans will notably become aware of the impasses resulting from 
wholesale individualism’ (Delors 1989c). Second, rarefied though these ideas are, there is an 
intellectual link between personalism as a political philosophy and the idea of European 
integration. As Loughlin (1993: 1) notes, a sense of frustration with the nation-state is a 
recurring theme for those personalists who believed in the ‘bypassing of the nation-state by a 
double movement or rather one movement with two aspects: “returning to the sources”; and 
building a federal Europe’. Although there is some overlap between Delors’ and Mounier’s 
thinking on international issues, personalism finds clearer expression in Delors’ involvement 
in the 1950s and 1960s in La Vie nouvelle, a Social Catholic movement inspired by 
Mounier’s teaching (Delors 1975: 38–9). 
 
How important Delors’ Catholicism was for his presidency of the European Commission is a 
matter of debate. He was certainly not a politician who was comfortable talking about his 
faith, describing himself in an interview long after he left Brussels as a ‘secular catholic’ who 
was critical of public figures who wore their religion on their sleeves (Delors 2004: 311–13). 
As Commission president, Delors emphasized dialogues with all faiths as well as with non-
believers (Delors 2004: 330), and his vision of European society was one that encompassed 
several religions as well as the Continent’s secular and intellectual traditions. Meanwhile, 
Delors’ relations with Pope John Paul II were strained, the pontiff being wary of the 
Commission president’s social Catholicism (Grant 1994: 83). 
 
Some scholars see Delors as using his faith to strategic advantage in his dealings with another 
Catholic politician, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Hutton 2008). While it is true that the French 
Socialist and the Germany Christian Democrat had a rapport, it had as much to do with their 
shared beliefs in this world than in the next. Delors was very much a man of the French Left, 
but his politics were more complicated than this label suggests. After the Second World War, 
he joined not the French section of the Workers’ International (Section Française de 
l’Internationale Ouvrière, SFOI) but Charles de Gaulle’s Popular Republican Movement 
(Mouvement républicain populaire, MRP), based on the belief that the latter was closer to his 
social Catholicism (Delors 1975: 27). Delors left the MRP after a matter of months, but he 
did not completely cut ties with the Right. This can be seen, for example, in Delors’ 
willingness to serve as an adviser to Gaullist prime minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas between 
1969 and 1972 (Ludlow forthcoming) and in his association with the politically mercurial 
Pierre Mendes France (Delors 2004: 86). Delors eventually joined the French Socialist Party 
in 1974 but he would retain, Wolfram Kaiser (2007: 325) suggests, a Christian Democratic 
side to his political character. This fact could explain Delors’ close working relationship with 
Germany’s Kohl, with Luxembourg’s Jacques Santer and Jean-Claude Juncker (Delors 2004: 
274), and with Belgium’s Phillipe Maystadt (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 707), as well as 
with other members of what Karl Magnus Johansson (2002) calls the Christian Democrat 
coalition on EMU. 
 
One issue on which Delors’ Catholicism is said to have shaped his Commission presidency 
concerns his championing of the idea of subsidiarity (Burgess 2000). Subsidiarity, the 
principle whereby ‘the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’ (Article 5, Treaty on European 
Union) is referenced in the Delors Report (Committee on Economic and Monetary Union 
1989: 18) and associated with the Catholic tradition (Follesdal 1998: 207). Care must be 
exercised, however, before jumping between Delors’ religious and political beliefs and his 
wider intellectual influence on EMU. For one thing, there is significant slippage between 
Delors’ usage of the term subsidiarity and that of Catholic theologians (Spicker 1991). Nor is 
subsidiarity a concept that Delors can claim copyright on, the European Parliament having 
done much to popularize the term in the 1970s (Peterson 1994). The United Kingdom was 
another early champion of subsidiarity, even if it did not use the term, and helped to ensure 
that the Community’s embryonic environmental policy included a principle about the 
concentration of Community activity on areas where it was likely to be most effective (Golub 
1996: 688). This principle was codified in the Single European Act’s provisions on 
environmental policy—the first reference to subsidiarity in the Treaties—under protest from 
Delors, who described the language agreed by Member States on environmental policy as 
‘window dressing’ (Golub 1996: 690). 
 
The fact that EU scholars have paid so much attention to Delors’ religious beliefs is, in one 
sense, testament to just how difficult it is to discern the influence of one or more mainstream 
macro-economic policy paradigms on his thinking. Take, for example, Margaret Thatcher’s 
conversion to monetarism in the 1970s, the subject of a classic case study by Peter Hall. In 
this account, Hall (1993) acknowledges the importance of political philosophy for Thatcher’s 
approach: The Road to Serfdom by Hayek is cited as a key influence in this regard. But he 
suggests that it was Milton Friedman’s monetarism that ultimately informed her rejection of 
the post-war Keynesian consensus. This is more than supposition on Hall’s part who can 
point towards the influence on Thatcher of think-tanks with an interest in monetarist 
economics and the appointment of monetarist-minded advisers, including Friedman himself, 
after the Conservatives won the 1979 general election. It is difficult to tell a similar story 
about Delors, who has variously been described as monetarist and neo-Keynesian but who 
remained reluctant to break with Keynesianism, even if he was critical at times of its 
application. This can be seen, for example, in Delors’ refusal to see the embrace of rigour (le 
tournant de la rigueu) as a paradigm shift from Keynesianism to monetarism. ‘I prefer the 
expression stable money rather than strong money’, he would later say of his policies during 
this period, ‘because the latter has taken on a monetarist connotation’ (Delors 1994: 160). 
Although Thatcher may have been a grudging admirer of French economic policy under 
Delors, the feeling was not mutual (Thatcher 2011: 81). The policies of Thatcher, he 
suggested, were not without reason, but they were excessively laissez-faire and neo-liberal 
for his tastes (Delors 1994: 80). 
 
For Maes (2004), Delors is a part of the ‘orthodox’ triptych in the French economic policy-
making tradition, alongside Jacques Rueff, a noted economic adviser to President Charles de 
Gaulle, and Raymond Barre, who served as prime minister of France (see Chapter 4 by 
Howarth). Rueff, Barre, and Delors showed a preference for rigour during periods of high 
crisis for the French economy that was at odds with what Maes (2004) calls ‘pragmatic 
Keynesians and left-wing economists’ of the day. And yet, there were important differences 
between Rueff and Barre on the one hand and Delors on the other. Rueff and Barre were 
members of the economic establishment. Rueff, for example, debated James Tobin in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics over Keynesian theory (Rueff 1947, 1948); while Barre 
(1966) introduced generations of students to economic theory with his two-volume textbook 
Économie politique. Delors made no such contribution to the mainstream economics 
literature and was, by comparison, altogether more heterodox in his approach to the 
discipline. 
 
Evidence of Delors’ eclectic economic thought can be found in his work as an academic 
economist. In 1973 he quit his role at the Interministerial Committee for Professional 
Training, which he had taken up after Chaban-Delmas lost the premiership twelve months 
earlier, to take up a post as visiting professor at Université Paris-Dauphine. At this institution, 
Delors taught a course on the comparative political economy of employment and industrial 
relations and established a research centre entitled ‘Travail et Sociétés’ (Delors 2004: 137). It 
was at this time that Delors, by his own admission, developed his thinking on the problem of 
inflation. This can be seen, for example, in his 1975 book, Changer, which devotes a chapter 
to inflation (Delors 1975: chapter 18). Here Delors makes the intellectual case for what 
would later become his policy of rigour by criticizing the government for trying to inflate 
their way out of downturns and social partners for their irresponsible wage demands (Delors 
1975: 305). There is also hint of monetarism in Delors’ criticism of central banks for 
pursuing lax monetary policy alongside a call for closer cooperation between national 
monetary authorities. There is no reference to the macro-economic rationale for such 
coordination, however, with Delors concentrating instead on the need for an international 
approach to prudential supervision (Delors 1975: 298). If a large multinational bank were 
unable to meet its obligations, then the inability of policy-makers to intervene in the way the 
Banque de France can in relation to French banks, he warns, would result in a ‘gigantic 
international crash’ (Delors 1975: 298). 
 
Changer also goes beyond mainstream macro-economic theory by offering a twist on the 
classic problem of demand–push inflation. Excessive demand is a key source of inflationary 
pressures, Delors speculates, in part because of the advertising industry’s encouragement of 
‘false needs’ (Delors 1975: 301). He would develop this line of argument in a background 
paper for a European Parliament study on the ‘problem of inflation’ (Delors 1976). In this 
paper, which Delors later said did much to develop his interest in inflation, he took aim at the 
problem of ostentatious and wasteful consumption as key drivers of rising prices. Noticeable 
by their absence here are detailed references to monetary and fiscal policy and the role of 
social partnership. Instead, Delors looks to the state’s role in managing the demand for scarce 
resources, inter alia, by investing in public transport, encouraging the production of durable 
goods and after-sales services, and promoting recycling (Delors 1976: 40), recommendations 
that recall his time at the French Planning Commission between 1962 and 1979. 
 
These writings on inflation in the 1970s offer only a glimpse of Delors’ thinking, but they do 
point towards an economic eclecticism that is important for understanding his subsequent 
views on EMU. First, they suggest a practical concern for real-world policy problems, such 
as inflation, rather than a theoretical predilection for specific policy solutions. Seen in these 
terms, it is not surprising that Delors championed France’s continued membership of the 
EMS during his time as French finance minister, while seeking to reform European monetary 
cooperation during his tenure as Commission president. Similarly, it is not surprising that he 
advocated fiscal discipline for France while resisting binding fiscal rules for EMU and that he 
continued to champion the EMS until the exchange-rate crisis of 1992–3. In all three cases, 
Delors’ policy advice was tailored to prevailing economic conditions and challenges rather 
than a commitment to a particular policy paradigm. Second, Delors’ search for policy 
solutions to such challenges reveals a basic affinity with Keynesianism but an openness to the 
insights of monetarism and policy planning. Such eclecticism helps to understand how Delors 
started out with a more or less Keynesian conception of EMU before backing an institutional 
design that owed more to German Ordo-liberalism with its emphasis on stability-oriented 
monetary policies, central bank independence, and fiscal discipline. 
 
If Delors’ economic eclecticism shaped his blurred vision of EMU, then so too did his 
particular views on European integration. Delors is sometimes described as a federalist (Ross 
1995: 47). However, such claims overlook the Frenchman’s ambivalence about European 
federalism. Although Delors would occasionally use the F-word (Delors 1990b), he neither 
joined the Union of European Federalists nor found common cause with federalist founding 
fathers such as Altiero Spinelli before or during his time as Commission president (Drake 
2000: 18). There was no shortage of opportunities for such alignment since Spinelli and 
Delors were both elected to the European Parliament in 1979, but the two men clearly had 
different political priorities in mind. Whereas Spinelli brought federalist MEPs together in the 
Crocodile Club, Delors founded the Amigo Club to encourage an informal exchange of views 
between social democratic MEPs. Nor did Delors, as Commission president, show much 
enthusiasm in public for Spinelli’s Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, which was 
published in 1984 and which included among its aims ‘the progressive achievement of full 
monetary union’.3 
 
There are at least three reasons why Delors was reluctant to throw in his lot with the 
European federalists and all three are relevant for understanding his blurred vision of EMU. 
First, federalism’s inherent idealism rested uneasily with Delors’ commitment to the art of the 
politically possible. Federalists such as Spinelli sought new competences for the Community 
across a wide range of policy areas with little apparent regard for their feasibility, but Delors 
preferred a minimalist approach based on identifying specific integrationist initiatives that 
enjoyed the support of key Member States. EMU did not initially enjoy such support, as 
Delors found out when he toured national capitals in 1984. This was one reason why he stuck 
to comparatively vague language about the reform of the EMS until signs of support for 
EMU started to emerge from France and Germany (Delors 1994: 220). It may also explain 
why Delors, having made the case for a centralized budgetary instrument in negotiations over 
the Maastricht Treaty, did not push harder on this issue after the Treaty was ratified. 
Second, the fact that European federalism came to be associated with the centralization of 
powers at the supranational level jarred with Delors’ long-standing interest in the 
decentralization of power (Drake 2000: 17–18). Although this interest found its clearest 
expression in Delors’ support for subsidiarity, it can also be seen in his initial reluctance to 
countenance a supranational monetary authority and a single currency. 
 
A third and final tension centres on the issue of a finalité politique. Whereas federalists such 
as Spinelli had in mind ‘the definitive abolition of the division of Europe into national 
sovereign States’, Delors preferred to talk of a ‘European federation of nation states’ a term 
that seeks to accommodate national and European ambitions while remaining vague as to the 
precise nature of such accommodation. 
Seen in this light, Delors’ unease with the link between EMU and political union at 
Maastricht is not hard to understand. Whereas federalists such as Spinelli were only too 
willing to sketch out their plans for political union, Delors saw projects such as the single 
market and EMU as decisive steps towards political union but did not offer a clear sense of 
where they might lead to. Such hesitancy can be seen, for example, in ‘Europe’s Ambitions’, 
an essay published by Delors on the eve of the IGC on political union (Delors 1990b). In this 
publication, Delors offered a thoughtful overview of the challenges facing the EU in the post-
Cold War period, ranging from the Community’s need to take the lead on issues such as 
democracy promotion and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to environmental 
policy. What Delors does not do here is say how the Community should address such 
challenges. It was not until the IGC was underway, indeed, that Delors made his first speech 
                                                        
3 ‘Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union’, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, No. C 77/33, 14 February 1984. 
on the modalities of European security cooperation and even then his thoughts were tentative 
(Delors 1991). 
 
FORESIGHT: CONTRIBUTION AND LEGACY 
 
So much for the origins of Delors’ vision of EMU. What about its relevance in light of the 
single currency’s successful launch in 1999 and its subsequent difficulties after the global 
financial crisis struck in 2007? Viewed through a long-angle lens, Delors can claim credit for 
succeeding where his predecessors at the European Commission fell short. Although he 
benefited from economic and political headwinds that the likes of Roy Jenkins and Robert 
Marjolin did not enjoy, Delors showed himself to be a more accomplished navigator. Both 
Marjolin, as Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs in the early 1960s, and 
Jenkins, as Commission president in the late 1970s, put forward grand visions for EMU that 
fell foul of the central bank governors and/or national governments (see Chapter 3 by Seidel 
and Chapter 6 by Ludlow). 
Delors, in contrast, began with a blurred vision of EMU that remained in the background 
until signs of political support within key Member States emerged and came into clearer 
focus only after national governments had agreed on a blueprint for EMU. Moravcsik (1998) 
is correct in saying that national policy-makers determined the final draft of the Delors 
Report, but this conclusion downplays Delors’ agnosticism about EMU’s design and his 
ability as chair to bridge the divide between Keynesian and non-Keynesian conceptions of 
European monetary cooperation. Whether Jenkins, a more ardent Keynesian (see Jenkins 
1978), or Marjolin, to whom the central bank governors did not warm (James 2012: 60), 
would have managed this feat is debatable. Nor is it certain that Karl Otto Pöhl, who would 
presumably have chaired the Committee on the Study of EMU in Delors’ absence (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999: 712), could have produced a workable blueprint for monetary union, 
given the Bundesbank president’s initial scepticism about the project and cavalier approach to 
the committee. 
 
Delors’ blurred vision may have been a strategic advantage in negotiations about EMU, but, 
seen through the rear-view mirror, it raises the question of whether he put politics before 
economics in his pursuit of a single currency. Although the preceding discussion challenges 
the conception of Delors as a European federalist, he did see EMU as a means to further the 
cause of European integration. Pursuing integration for integration’s sake is a recipe for 
impetuous policy-making, and Delors, for his part, may have been guilty of undue haste in his 
pursuit of EMU. During his time as Commission president, there was scope for a more 
rigorous assessment of the economics of EMU. True, the Padoa-Schioppa Report, which 
Delors commissioned, helped to highlight the risks to fixed exchange-rate regimes from 
capital mobility. But, as noted previously, the Commission president’s reading of this report 
was a selective one, which downplayed Padoa-Schioppa’s warnings over the EMS and 
reworked his choice between full and flexible exchange rates into a gradualist argument for 
EMU. 
 
This reticence about understanding EMU from first principles can be seen in the Delors 
Report, which at Delors’ insistence stuck to its task of analysing the how of EMU rather than 
the why (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 715–16) and in the Commission’s cost–benefit 
analysis of EMU, ‘One Market, One Money’ (European Commission 1990b). Detailed 
though the latter was, it was published only after stage one of EMU was underway. The 
report’s dismissive approach to optimum currency area theory as being ‘a too narrow and 
somewhat outdated framework of analysis’ (European Commission 1990b: 31) was also 
symptomatic of Delors’ reluctance to engage with so-called Anglo-Saxon economists, whom 
he saw as having an anti-EU agenda (see Moore 2011). Imperfect though optimum currency 
area theory may be, it would have helped to focus Delors’ mind on the need to reduce 
exposure to asymmetric shocks and enable adjustment mechanisms in the absence of nominal 
exchange rates. 
 
Slavish devotion to one economic theory can produce tunnel vision, but an eclectic approach 
that jumps between theories can lead to inconsistent analysis. Delors’ vision of EMU, it could 
be argued, suffered from two key inconsistencies. The first was its lack of regard for the 
problem of cross-border financial supervision in EMU. Although this charge could be 
levelled at a long list of economists, Delors himself seemed well aware in the mid-1970s that 
the international financial system was ill-prepared to deal with troubled multinational banks 
(Delors 1975: 298). Yet he said little about this issue when it came to debate on EMU in the 
1980s and 1990s, even though the Padoa-Schioppa Report explicitly called for a coordinated 
approach to financial supervision (Padoa-Schioppa 1987: 47). 
 
The second more glaring inconsistency in Delors’ vision concerns his analysis of the fiscal 
dimension of EMU. During debates about EMU’s design Delors argued against binding fiscal 
rules at the EU level, which he saw as unworkable, and for a modest increase in the EU 
budget to allow for cyclical stabilization (James 2012: 252–3). Having found himself on the 
losing side of both arguments, it is then puzzling why Delors did not push harder for a 
reconfiguration of EMU’s fiscal dimension after the Maastricht negotiations concluded. 
Political pragmatism may explain Delors’ reticence. The Commission did undertake a major 
study on public finances in EMU, but its publication was delayed, according to Charles 
Goodhart, an economist who contributed to the report, so as not to jeopardize negotiations 
over the EU budget at Edinburgh in 1992 (Goodhart 2006: 247). A degree of economic 
myopia in Delors’ vision of EMU was also discernible. Always self-critical on such matters, 
Delors suggested in a lecture to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Journal of Common 
Market Studies that he may have placed too much faith in EU regional policy to promote 
convergence between Member States (Delors 2013). 
 
If Delors’ vision of EMU fell short in these and other respects it also remains highly salient in 
others. Although his faith in the ability of market mechanisms to keep public finances in 
check is difficult to defend, given the low long-term interest rates enjoyed by high-debt 
Member States such as Belgium, Italy, and Greece during the first ten years of EMU, the 
Commission president was right to foresee political difficulties in the implementation of 
fiscal deficit and public debt criteria of the SGP. Whether Delors’ proposal for a 
corresponding pacte pour la coordination des politiques économique would have made much 
difference here is difficult to say. But it can be seen as a forerunner to the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure launched in 2011 to address the kind of cross-country growth and 
inflation differences that marred the first decade of the euro. Also prescient here was Delors’ 
call in March 1990 for the incorporation of ‘budgetary rules or guidelines into national law’, 
an idea that would be later codified in the Fiscal Compact, an intergovernmental treaty 
designed to promote closer economic policy coordination in light of the global financial crisis 
and that entered into force in January 2012. 
 
Delors will also see his legacy in Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, a high-
level report presented by the president of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy in 
December 2012 (Van Rompuy 2012). Not only does the title of this report echo Delors’ call 
in 1985 for ‘a genuine European monetary area’ (Delors 1985b), it also owes an intellectual 
debt to the former Commission president’s proposal for financial inducements for supply-side 
reforms and a centralized budgetary mechanism for EMU. Whether the political-economy 
obstacles to such proposals are any more surmountable than they were in the 1980s and 
1990s is a moot point, but what is clear is that Delors vision of EMU, however blurred, 
remains relevant. 
 
In conclusion, Delors was without doubt a highly visible player in the founding of EMU, 
even if scholars disagree as to whether his role was a leading or supporting one. This chapter 
has sought to understand Delors’ intellectual contribution to the project by exploring how and 
why he came to support the idea of EMU before considering his legacy in light of the single 
currency’s ups and downs. Delors’ vision of EMU is a blurred one, it was argued, insofar as 
he has been unwavering in his support of the project since the early 1960s but wilfully 
obscure at times about what sort of EMU he was in favour of. Prior to joining the European 
Commission in 1985, Delors’ enthusiasm for EMU was a long-standing matter of record, but 
his thinking on whether it would involve closer macro-economic policy coordination or the 
ceding of policy-making powers to the supranational level was not. Upon assuming the role 
of Commission president, Delors weighed his words carefully about the merits and modalities 
of monetary union until his work as chair of the Committee on the Study of Economic and 
Monetary Union was done. He said even less about EMU’s institutional design after the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed. Since leaving the Commission in 1995, Delors has been 
consistently critical of Member States for failing to embrace some form of European 
economic government, but his remarks on this matter leave open the question of precisely 
what he has in mind. 
 
This blurred vision of EMU reflected Delors’ economic eclecticism as well as his ambivalent 
relationship with European federalism. On the first of these points, Delors was seen to have a 
more or less Keynesian outlook, but his criticisms of Keynesian economic policies in France 
and his openness to alternative approaches, be it monetarism, policy planning, or heterodox 
economics, suggested a reluctance to align himself with any one mainstream macro-economic 
theory. This helps to understand Delors’ reluctance to define EMU in strict terms and his 
willingness to look beyond Keynesian conceptions of economic and monetary policy during 
EMU negotiations. 
 
On the second point, Delors saw EMU as a means to further the cause of European 
integration, but his pragmatic and philosophical objections to European federalism help to 
explain his reticence at various points towards centralized approaches to decision-making in 
the embryonic Euro Area. It also places Delors’ evident unease when it came to discussions 
of political union at Maastricht within its proper intellectual context. 
Turning to Delors’ legacy in relation to the euro, EMU may ultimately be the product of a 
political process in which Member States chose to cede control over monetary policy to the 
supranational level. But Delors helped to facilitate this process through his adroit approach to 
the project and his adept chairing of the Committee on the Study of Economic and Monetary 
Union. Here Delors’ economic eclecticism and equivocal views on European federalism were 
a strategic asset since they sensibly encouraged him to hold fire on EMU until signs of 
support from key Member States emerged and, thereafter, to build bridges between policy-
makers with Keynesian and Ordo-liberal conceptions of EMU, not to mention varying 
degrees of commitment to the European project. 
 
All of this raises the question, however, of whether Delors put politics before economics in 
his pursuit of EMU and whether a more candid approach to the constraints of a one-size-fits-
all monetary policy would have encouraged more prudent economic policies by Euro Area 
members in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Key inconsistencies in Delors’ vision of 
EMU included his failure to follow up on initial concerns about international prudential 
banking supervision and his reluctance to press the case for strengthening EMU’s fiscal 
dimension. That said, Delors can claim to have been ahead of the curve in predicting 
problems with the implementation of the SGP, even if his proposals for an alternative 
approach to economic policy coordination remained vague. Delors’ vision of EMU can also 
be seen to a certain degree in reforms to EMU enacted or proposed in the light of the global 
financial crisis, including the codification of national fiscal rules under the Fiscal Compact 
and plans to offer financial inducements for supply-side reforms and to develop a fiscal 
capacity. In this sense, though Delors may not be the visionary that he is sometimes said to 
be, his vision of EMU remains an illuminating one. 
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